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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION
ROBERT SHELTON, 
Plaintiff
Case No. l:ll-cv-381 
Litkovitz, M.J.
v.
CITY OF CINCINNATI, et al„ ORDER
Defendants
Plaintiff Robert Shelton brings this action alleging employment discrimination and 
retaliation against his employer, the City of Cincinnati (“City”) and the City’s former Fire Chief, 
Robert Wright (“Wright”). The matter is before the Court on defendant Wright’s motion for 
summary judgment (Doc. 22), plaintiffs opposing memorandum (Doc. 31), and Wright’s reply 
in support of the motion (Doc. 33), and upon the City’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 24), 
plaintiffs opposing memorandum (Doc. 30), and the City’s reply in support of its motion. (Doc.
I. Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff has been employed by the City as a firefighter since February of 1995. (Pltf. 
Depo. at 8). Defendant Robert Wright served as Chief of the City’s Fire Department until his 
retirement in January 2011. (Wright Depo. at 6). The last day on which Wright reported to work 
was on or around November 8, 2010. {Id. at 6-7).
Plaintiff was diagnosed with diabetes prior to beginning his employment with the City.
He disclosed his diabetes to the City’s Employment Health Service (“EHS”) in 1994 during a 
pre-employment health screening. (Pltf. Depo. at 11).
32).
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A. City policies
A Labor-Management Agreement (LMA) in effect between the City and the local union 
at all relevant times governed the process for returning a firefighter to duty following certain 
absences. (Doc. 22 at 9, citing LMA at § 28.6).1 2Pursuant to the process, the Fire Department 
can require a member who has missed three or more continuous tours on account of sickness 
with pay (“SWP”) to be evaluated by EHS prior to returning to duty. (Doc. 30-2 at 3). The Fire 
Department can likewise require a firefighter who has used SWP for a specified condition, 
including pneumonia, to undergo an EHS exam prior to returning to work. {Id.). EHS makes the 
determination as to whether an individual can perform the functions of a firefighter. (Ronald 
Texter Depo. at 59). In ascertaining an individuafs fitness for duty, the focus is on whether the 
employee can perform his job safely and without harming himself or others. (Dr. Ariff Mehter, 
M.D., Depo. at 35). According to Dr. Mehter, the City’s full-time EHS physician since July 
2004, EHS is limited to requesting whatever medical records are relevant to ascertaining a 
member’s fitness for duty when performing its evaluation. (Mehter Depo. at 6-7, 34).
Section 32.8 of the LMA, “Limited Duty,” provides that members “who suffer temporary 
disabilities from on or off duty injuries may, upon recommendation of the EHS physician, be 
placed on limited duty.” (Doc. 23, Exh. 11). The member may submit for consideration medical 
records from his personal/treating physician regarding the limited duty determination, and the 
EHS physician is required to include and consider recommendations submitted by the 
personal/treating physician regarding the limited duty determination. (Id.). The decision to offer
1 Defendant Wright asserts that Exhibit 11 contains the relevant pages from the LMA. (Doc. 22 at 9, n. 2). Exhibit 
11 does not contain the relevant pages o f the LMA, but the relevant provision is included in an arbitrator’s decision 
found at Doc. 30-2.
2 Texter was the Fire Department’s Safety Risk Manager from 2003 to March 2011.
2
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medical limited duty is made by the EHS physician. (Texter Depo. at 51). An individual 
assigned to light duty is paid his regular pay. (Texter Depo. at 59).
Pursuant to § 28.12 of the LMA, if the EHS physician determines that the member should 
be medically separated and the member’s treating physician disagrees, the City and the member 
will mutually select a third physician to resolve the disagreement. (Doc. 23, Exh. 11). The third 
physician’s decision “shall be submitted to the Department Head or his designee for 
consideration in determining whether medical separation is appropriate.” (Id.). The third- 
physician review process set forth in § 28.12 of the LMA was the procedure by which a 
firefighter could challenge a light-duty assignment. (Texter Depo. at 39-41).
B. Plaintiffs medical and work history
1. February 2004 hypoglycemic episode
Plaintiff had a hypoglycemic episode while working at a two-alarm fire scene in February 
2004. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 54). He felt weak and was told he had “mental status changes.” (Id.). 
When examined by Dr. Mehter the following day, the episode was found to be resolved and 
plaintiff was returned to full duty. (Id.).
2. August 2004 - October 2005 illnesses and hypoglycemic episode
In August of 2004, plaintiff took a leave of absence from work under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and SWP for surgery on his uvula and palate. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 
67, p. 2; Pltf. Depo. at 19-20). When plaintiff was ready to return to work, he presented a note 
from his doctor to EHS. (Pltf. Depo. at 20). The EHS records indicate that plaintiff telephoned 
on December 14, 2004, and stated he was having some problems with his blood sugar and chest 
pain. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 67, p. 2). Plaintiff reported he had seen his primary care physician 
and had undergone a stress test, which was normal, and his blood pressure had been elevated but
3
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was now 122/80 after his medication was readjusted. (Id.). Plaintiff stated he wanted to return 
to work and he had a note from his doctor. (Id.). He was advised he needed to get his records 
and to sign releases, and he was informed he would probably be put on limited duty until the 
records were received. (Id.). Plaintiff was placed on limited duty effective December 16, 2004. 
(Doc. 23, Exh. 2).
During early 2005, plaintiff was in contact with EHS on several occasions concerning the
release of his medical records. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 67, p. 3). Plaintiff refused to release some of
the requested medical records as he did not believe they were pertinent to the fitness-for-duty
examination. (Doc. 23, Exhs. 2, 3). On January 19, 2005, plaintiff filed a formal grievance
based on EHS’s refusal to release him to return to work despite the information provided by his
treating physicians. (Doc. 23, Exh. 2; Pltf. Depo. at 13-14).
On April 4, 2005, Texter advised plaintiff that the EHS physician could not make an
informed opinion regarding plaintiffs fitness for duty without the full release of plaintiffs
medical records pertinent to his absence from work beginning August 19, 2004. (Doc. 23, Exh.
4). Texter asked plaintiff to sign a release for that period and informed plaintiff that his refusal
to cooperate made it unreasonable to expect the Fire Department to maintain his limited duty
status indefinitely during the conflict with EHS. (Id.). Texter further stated:
Article 32, Section 8, Paragraph (A) of the Labor Management Agreement states: 
“Members of the Fire Department who suffer temporary disabilities from on or 
off duty injuries may, upon recommendation of the Employee Health Physician, 
be placed on Limited Duty.” The operative word in the statement is “MAY.”
Limited Duty is a privilege not a right and can be denied and revoked if the 
circumstances so indicate. Secondly, you are not on Limited Duty from an on or 
off duty injury. You were placed in this status only to provide a grace period until 
appropriate documentation could be provided to EHS. Since this appears not to 
be happening, Limited Duty will no longer be offered as an option. 3
3 In a grievance he subsequently filed, plaintiff stated he was placed on limited duty effective December 16, 2005. 
(Doc. 23, Exh. 2). However, it is apparent that there is a typographical error in the exhibit and the actual date he 
was placed on limited duty was December 16, 2004.
4
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Article 28, Section 4, states: “Members returning from a serious health condition 
as defined under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) may be required by the 
Fire Department to be evaluated by a city-approved licensed health care provider 
prior to return to duty. . .
(Doc. 23, Exh. 4).
Texter advised plaintiff that he could use his accrued leave time while the matter was 
being resolved; plaintiff would not be offered any duty status until released as “fit for duty” by 
the City physician; and he would therefore be carried in a leave without pay status after his leave 
time had been exhausted and until the matter was finally resolved. {Id.). Texter strongly urged 
plaintiff to reconsider his position on providing the necessary documentation to the City 
physician so that the matter could be resolved. {Id.). On October 6, 2005, the Fire Department 
and the local union entered into an agreement that resolved plaintiffs grievance and permitted 
plaintiff to return to limited duty so long as he provided EHS with all of the requested medical 
records. (Doc. 23, Exh. 5).
In October of 2005, plaintiff experienced a hypoglycemic event while in his automobile 
on his way to work. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 61). Plaintiff had skipped breakfast because he was 
“running late” and intended to eat at work, and he lost consciousness at an intersection. {Id.). 
He did not have an accident and reported afterwards to his physician, Dr. Kenneth Kreines, 
M.D., that he since understood the importance of never delaying a meal. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 
58). In the wake of that incident, the Fire Department requested that plaintiff be given “a 
complete physical examination concerning his general health condition as related to his most 
recent incident of incapacitation, in light of his documented medical history. . . .” (Mehter Depo. 
Exh. 59). EHS physician Dr. William Kelley, M.D., issued an opinion on November 21, 2005, 
stating that he had received the office records from plaintiffs attending physician and it was Dr.
5
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Kelley’s medical opinion that plaintiff “has a medical condition that places him and others at risk 
of injury during the performance of unrestricted firefighting. I recommend that he not perform 
unrestricted firefighting. His condition is not expected to prohibit restricted duty provided he 
does not drive City vehicles or work around open dangerous machinery or at unprotected 
heights.” (Mehter Depo. Exh. 60). Dr. Kelley opined that plaintiff should be able to commence 
restricted duty when cleared for it by his attending physician. (Id.).
In response to Dr. Kelley’s opinion, plaintiff submitted a letter from his treating 
physician, Dr. Kreines, dated November 30, 2005. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 58). Dr. Kreines stated 
that plaintiff had Type II diabetes of approximately 13 years duration for which he was treated 
with insulin. Dr. Kreines recounted the two insulin reactions plaintiff had experienced over the 
last several years: (1) the incident at the fire scene one year earlier when plaintiff was required 
to fight two fires in rapid succession without time for a meal, and (2) the attack plaintiff had in 
his car at the intersection in October. Dr. Kreines stated that plaintiff had been seen in the office 
three times by diabetes educators and was “progressing nicely toward a clearer understanding of 
his treatment.” (Id.). Dr. Kreines stated it was his medical opinion that “if Mr. Shelton carefully 
follows the directions which we are providing he should be able to safely perform unrestricted 
duties as a firefighter. His kidney involvement and elevated blood pressure are warning signs 
that he must improve his diabetes control but are not contraindications at this stage as to his 
employment as an unrestricted firefighter.” (Id.).
Because there was a conflict between the EHS physician and plaintiffs physician as to 
whether plaintiff could return to full duty, Dr. Malcolm Steiner, M.D., performed an independent 
assessment on May 19, 2006. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 61). Dr. Steiner assessed whether plaintiff 
could safely perform unrestricted firefighting duties given his Insulin Treated Diabetes Mellitus.
6
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(Id.). Dr. Steiner concluded that plaintiff could “work unrestricted as a fire fighter within a safe 
practice protocol,” which meant that he needed to follow “established guidelines for nutritional, 
insulin therapy and monitoring practices under the care of a Diabetes specialist in order to safely 
perform as a firefighter.” (Id.). Plaintiff agreed to release his medical records on June 7, 2006, 
pertinent to the independent third physician review. (Pltf. Depo. at 22).
Defendant Wright decided to return plaintiff to full duty on June 9, 2006, with certain 
conditions. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 62). Plaintiff was required to follow established nutritional 
guidelines, insulin therapy, and monitoring practices under the care of a diabetes specialist as 
noted by Dr. Steiner. (Id.). Wright testified that Dr. Kelley disagreed with his decision. (Wright 
Depo. at 18-19). Wright subsequently sent an email to EHS in which he stated that it appeared 
EHS physicians and Chuck Haas, the City’s Risk Manager, were disappointed that he had 
decided to return plaintiff to full duty and were opposing “this legitimate resolution of his 
situation.” (Wright Depo. at 12; Wright Depo. Exh. 33).
3. September 2007 illness
On September 8, 2007, plaintiff became ill at work and began vomiting upon completing 
a run at 2:45 a.m. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 63). Plaintiff planned to drive home but was advised by 
his coworkers to call his wife, who picked him up and drove him to the hospital. (Id.). Plaintiff 
was initially diagnosed with pneumonia or possible pneumonia and admitted to the hospital for 
four days. (Tr. 30-31, 152-53; Mehter Depo. Exh. 65). Wright requested that plaintiff undergo a 
fitness-for-duty examination after it was reported to him that plaintiff was “incoherent” when he 
left the station and had been hospitalized. (Wright Depo. at 21). It was also reported to Wright 
that plaintiff had pneumonia and it was a minor illness. (Id. at 24). Wright could not recall 
another instance that was not related to substance abuse or an on-the-job injury where he had
7
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ordered a firefighter to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination. (Wright Depo. at 23). Although 
plaintiff was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of possible pneumonia (Mehter Depo. Exh. 
65), during his hospital stay plaintiff was found to be suffering from acute respiratory failure, 
stage 4 chronic kidney disease, severe aortic valve disorder, unspecified anemia, and fluid 
overload. (Pltf. Depo. at 31).
When plaintiff returned to work, his captain informed him that Wright was requiring 
plaintiff to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination. (Pltf. Depo. at 143). Plaintiff questioned 
why this was required as he had missed only one tour, not three consecutive tours as required 
under the LMA. (Id. at 143-47). The captain informed plaintiff that it was Wright’s discretion 
as to whether to require an exam under the LMA because plaintiff had pneumonia. (Tr. 144-45). 
On October 4, 2007, Texter requested that EHS give plaintiff a complete physical examination 
concerning his general health condition as related to the incident. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 59).
Plaintiff reported for a fitness-for-duty examination and was examined by Dr. Kelley on 
October 16, 2007. Dr. Kelley informed plaintiff that he had heard plaintiff had “passed out” at 
work, which plaintiff denies had occurred. (Pltf. Depo. at 151). At the conclusion of the 
examination, Dr. Kelley reported that he had “already given the Fire Department my opinion 
about his duty status. I do not think he should do unrestricted firefighting. He doesn’t even meet 
the DOT [Department of Transportation] exemption criteria for driving with his hypoglycemic 
episodes.” (Mehter Depo. Exh. 63). Dr. Kelley stated he could not give an additional duty status 
opinion in view of the most recent event without adequate information about the event. (Id.).
On November 5, 2007, Texter sent plaintiff a memorandum from Dr. Kelley advising 
plaintiff that the last records he submitted were not sufficient for Dr. Kelley to complete an 
independent medical review for plaintiffs fitness-for-duty examination. (Doc. 23, Exh. 9).
8
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Texter advised plaintiff that he needed to provide the requested records and if he failed to make 
arrangements to do so or unduly delayed the process, he would be suspended until he complied 
or was cleared for full duty by the EHS physician. (Id.).
On November 29, 2007, Dr. Kelley reported that plaintiffs hospital records had been 
obtained and that plaintiff had “progressively worsening medical conditions other than the 
condition for which he was restricted per my memo of 11/21/2005. In light of these additional 
conditions it is my recommendation that he be limited to light duty.” (Mehter Depo. Exh. 68). 
On December 21, 2007, Dr. K. Shashi Kant, M.D., a treating physician who was following 
plaintiff for “chronic kidney disease in the setting of type II diabetes,” wrote that plaintiff was 
currently asymptomatic from most of his conditions and had no evidence of any symptoms 
related to his chronic kidney disease. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 69). Dr. Kant stated that plaintiff 
should be able to return to his “full, unrestricted firefighting duties.” (Id.). He stated that 
plaintiff was being reevaluated periodically and was in the process of being evaluated for a 
future renal transplant. (Id.).
On March 3, 2008, plaintiff requested a third-party physician review. (Pltf. Depo. at 44). 
The parties had difficulty agreeing on a third-party physician, and plaintiff remained on light 
duty through 2008. (Pltf. Depo. at 45). On or about February 23, 2009, Texter requested a third- 
physician review for plaintiff. (Doc. 23, Exh. 11). On March 10, 2009, plaintiff declined the 
third-party physician selected by the City to perform the fitness-for-duty examination. (Pltf. 
Depo. at 57; Doc. 23, Exh. 13).
On September 29, 2009, Texter wrote plaintiff a letter captioned “Medical Separation 
Process.” (Doc. 23, Exh. 17). Texter stated in the letter that it had been discovered during the 
search for a third-party physician to provide the “Third Physician Review” that plaintiff had
9
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failed to disclose one of his treating physicians. Texter informed plaintiff that if he did not 
provide a signed release for that physician’s medical records within two weeks, his limited duty 
privileges would be revoked in October 2009 and the process of separation from the City would 
be implemented 90 days later on December 29, 2009. On October 1, 2009, plaintiff filed a 
grievance on the ground that he was being denied the third-party physician review under § 28.12 
of the LMA and was also being denied limited duty for refusing to release his medical records. 
(Doc. 23, Exh. 11). Plaintiff requested that he be granted a third-physician review and that he be 
permitted to remain in a limited-duty status pending the final outcome of the third-physician 
review process.
Subsequently, in November 2009, Wright removed plaintiff from paid limited-duty 
status. According to Texter and Wright, plaintiff was removed from limited-duty status because 
he was not cooperating in the third-party physician review process and he refused to sign a 
medical release for EHS to obtain his medical records. (Wright Depo. at 30-31; Texter Depo. at 
60). Plaintiff did not receive a salary after he was removed from limited-duty status but he 
continued to receive benefits. (Texter Depo. at 61).
Plaintiffs grievance proceeded to arbitration and a decision was rendered on March 11, 
2010. (Doc. 30-2, Pltf. Depo. Exh. 12). The arbitrator sustained the grievance; determined that 
the third-party physician review process was to be completed; decided that plaintiff must release 
his medical records only if the third-party physician decided he needed them to evaluate 
plaintiffs ability to return to full, unrestricted firefighting duty; and ordered that plaintiff be 
returned to limited duty while the third-party physician review process continued. The City 
contacted plaintiff and offered to return him to limited duty pending the third-party physician 
review process. (Pltf. Depo. at 53). Plaintiff did not return to limited duty at that time, and the
10
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third-party physician review process continued. (Id.). Returning plaintiff to limited duty would 
have interfered with the outside jobs he held at the time. (Id. at 54).
Plaintiff was hospitalized after undergoing heart valve surgery in June 2010, and he was 
kept off work by his doctor for five weeks. (Pltf. Depo. at 54-55). Plaintiff subsequently had a 
kidney transplant in November 2010. (Id. at 88). Chief Wright reported for his last day of work 
that same month.
Following a six-week recuperation period for the kidney transplant surgery, plaintiff was 
cleared to return to limited-duty status on or about January 3, 2011. (Pltf. Depo. at 88-89). 
Between January 27 and March 25, 2011, plaintiffs various transplant and treating physicians 
rendered opinions that plaintiff was capable of returning to full unrestricted firefighting duty. 
(Mehter Depo. Exhs. 78-81). EHS physician Dr. Mehter issued an opinion dated February 23, 
2011, that plaintiff could return to work with the restrictions imposed by Dr. Kelley on 
November 21, 2005 and November 29, 2007. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 82). Texter initiated a request 
for a third-party physician exam shortly thereafter, which Dr. Susan S. Stegman performed. 
(Pltf.’s Depo. at 91). On May 17, 2011, Dr. Stegman gave her “very strong opinion” that 
plaintiff could return to “full, unrestricted firefighting duty effective immediately.” (Mehter 
Depo. Exh. 83). Dr. Stegman stated that she could find “no medical reason to delay this ruling 
any further.” (Id.). Plaintiff was subsequently returned to full duty and has remained in that 
status. (Pltf. Depo. at 91-92).
As a result of being placed on limited-duty status, plaintiffs hours were changed, which 
precluded him from earning extra income at his other part-time jobs, and he was required to use 
holiday and sick time to fulfill his obligations to his other jobs. (Pltf. Depo. at 120-21, 141-42).
11
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C. Paramedic program
In 2008 or 2009, the City instituted its Paramedic Training Program (“PTP”). (Locasto 
Depo. at 8). City firefighters are able to participate in the program free of charge. (Wright 
Depo. at 39). Plaintiff was enrolled in the 2009 PTP class, while he was on paid limited-duty 
status. (Locasto Depo. at 8-9). On or about April 7, 2009, the City removed plaintiff from the 
PTP at Chief Wright’s direction because plaintiff purportedly could not complete the program 
requirements. (Locasto Depo. at 19-20; Wright Depo. at 43). Specifically, a participant in the 
program must complete “ride time,” which involves riding with certified paramedics and 
observing their work in the field. (Locasto Depo. at 17). Wright testified that he decided to not 
allow plaintiff to obtain his ride time with the City because historically an individual who was on 
limited duty did not ride on Fire Department equipment. (Wright Depo. at 46-47). Plaintiff was 
initially told it would be acceptable if he could get his ride time with a fire department other than 
the City of Cincinnati (Id. at 42), and plaintiff advised the City that he would be able to obtain 
his ride time outside the City. (Pltf. Depo. at 72-73). However, Wright testified that he 
subsequently decided to remove plaintiff from the program because the other fire departments 
with whom plaintiff could ride wanted Wright to sign a waiver indemnifying them against any 
issues, which Wright could not do (Wright Depo. at 42), and Wright was informed by the City’s 
Medical Director, Dr. Locasto, that other requirements of the program could not be substituted 
for ride time. (Wright Depo. at 42-43). Dr. Locasto testified that from his perspective as 
Medical Director, plaintiffs “light duty” status would not have affected his ability to complete 
the program in any way. (Locasto Depo. at 15). Dr. Locasto testified that at some point he 
became aware plaintiff was receiving dialysis while participating in the PTP, but this would not
12
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have prevented plaintiff from successfully completing his ride time on City units without any 
accommodation. (Locasto Depo. at 17-18).
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission 
(“OCRC”) on April 20, 2009, alleging that he was unlawfully removed from the PTP based on a 
perceived disability. (Doc. 23, Exh. 23).
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 allows summary judgment to secure a just and efficient determination 
of an action. The court may only grant summary judgment as a matter of law when the moving 
party has identified, as its basis for the motion, an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, A ll  U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but .. . must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, A ll  U.S. 242, 248 (1986) 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank o f Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)). The evidence of 
the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Id. at 
255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970)). However, a district court 
need not view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party if that party’s version 
of events is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” 
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
The court is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but is to 
decide whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, A ll  U.S. at 249. There is no genuine 
issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return 
a verdict for that party. Id. (citing Cities Serv., 391 U.S. at 288-289). If the evidence is merely
13
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colorable, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84 (1967), or is not significantly probative, 
Cities Serv., 391 U.S. at 290, judgment may be granted. Anderson, A ll  U.S. at 249.
III. Claims against the City
A. Disability discrimination claims 
1. Applicable law
The ADA applies to the alleged discriminatory acts that occurred in this case prior to 
January 1, 2009. The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) 
applies to the alleged discriminatory acts that occurred after January 1, 2009.4 
Federal law makes it unlawful for a covered employer to discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability with respect to discharge and “employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
The Ohio Civil Rights Act provides that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice “[f]or any 
employer, because of the .. . [disability] . . .  of any person . . .  to discriminate against that person 
with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter 
directly or indirectly related to employment.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A). The analysis of 
plaintiffs disability discrimination claims is generally the same under both the federal and state 
statutes. See Jakubowski v. The Christ Hospital, 627 F.3d 195, 201 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Kleiber v. Honda o f Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted)).
To establish his claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) he is disabled, (2) he is qualified to perform the job requirements with or without reasonable 
accommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision because of the disability. 
Frengler v. General Motors, No. 11-3378, 2012 WL 2044419, at *2 (6th Cir. June 7, 2012)
4 The ADA was amended by the AD AAA effective January 1, 2009. The AD AAA does not apply to pre­
amendment conduct. Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. o f Educ., 569 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2009).
14
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(citing Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Donald v. 
Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2012)). See also Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 
645, 649 (6th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff must establish that his disability was a “but for” cause of 
the employer’s adverse employment action. Lewis, 681 F.3d 312. The employee need not 
“show that the disability was the ‘sole’ cause of the adverse employment action.” Id. at 316.
A plaintiff can establish a claim of disability discrimination through either direct or 
indirect evidence.* 045 Direct evidence is “that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion 
that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Amini v. 
Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2006) (race discrimination) (quoting Kocakv.
Cmty. Health Partners o f Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir. 2005)); Grizzell v. City o f 
Columbus Div. o f Police, 461 F.3d 711,719 (6th Cir. 2006) (Title VII). Direct evidence must 
prove not only discriminatory animus, but also that the employer actually acted on that animus. 
See Amini, 440 F.3d at 359. Direct evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to 
draw any inferences in order to conclude that a challenged employment action was motivated at 
least in part by prejudice against members of the protected group. Wells v. Cincinnati Children’s 
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 860 F. Supp. 2d 469, 479-80 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (Beckwith, J.) (citing Johnson v. 
Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003)).
5 To make out a prima facie case o f disability discrimination through indirect evidence, a plaintiff must show: 1) he 
is disabled; 2) he is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; 3) he suffered 
an adverse employment decision; 4) the employer knew or had reason to know o f plaintiffs disability; and 5) the 
position remained open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced.
Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253, 258-259 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Macy v. Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 
F.3d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996)). Once 
the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory 
explanation for the employment action. Id. at 259 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802­
04 (1973); Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 703 (6th Cir. 2008)). If the defendant does so, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s explanation is pretextual. Id. at 260 (citations 
omitted).
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Where there is direct evidence that the employer relied on the employee’s impairments in 
making an adverse employment decision, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting format does 
not apply.6 See Wells, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 479-80 (citing Monette, 90 F.3d at 1184, abrogated on 
other grounds by Lewis, 681 F.3d 312). Instead, the plaintiff must prove he is “disabled” within 
the meaning of the Act and that he was “otherwise qualified for the position.” Id. (citing 
Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186). An individual is not “a qualified individual with a disability” so as to 
satisfy the second element of a disability claim if the individual “poses a ‘direct threat’ to the 
health or safety of others. . . .” Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 10-3629, 2012 WL 1449683, at 
*9 (6th Cir. April 27, 2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). However, 
an employer cannot deny an employment opportunity to an individual with a disability because 
of a slightly increased risk of harm. Wurzel, 2012 WL 1449683, at *9. There must be “a 
significant risk, i. e. high probability, of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is 
insufficient.” Id. (quoting Estate o f Mauro By and Through Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 
137 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 1998)).
2. The City is not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs disability 
discrimination claims.
Plaintiff claims that the City discriminated against him by subjecting him to a number of 
adverse job actions because the City perceived him to be disabled with respect to the major life 
activity of working in violation of the ADA, the AD AAA, and Ohio Rev. Code Ch. 4112. The 
Court will address each of these adverse job actions in turn.
6 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting format applies where the plaintiff seeks to prove his case by 
circumstantial evidence. See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1184-85. Although the parties analyze plaintiffs disability 
discrimination claims in the context o f  the McDonnell Douglas framework, the record contains direct evidence that 
the City perceived plaintiff as being disabled.
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The first adverse job action is the City’s refusal to reinstate plaintiff to full-duty status 
through December 2008 following his brief illness and hospitalization in September 2007. 
Plaintiff claims that the City’s refusal to reinstate him to full-duty status during this time period 
violated the ADA and the Ohio statute. Plaintiff contends that a reasonable jury could disbelieve 
the City’s stated reason that it found plaintiff was unfit for the job of firefighting and instead 
determine that the City acted as it did because it perceived him to be disabled due to his diabetes. 
(Doc. 30 at 13-14).
This adverse job action is properly analyzed under the direct evidence framework. 
Plaintiff has introduced direct evidence that the City refused to return him to full duty following 
his hospitalization in 2007 and during 2008 because of his diabetic condition. In an 
interdepartmental memorandum dated November 21, 2005, Dr. Kelley opined that plaintiff was 
precluded from working in any job involving driving City vehicles, working around open 
dangerous machinery, or working at unprotected heights following plaintiffs October 2005 
hypoglycemic (diabetic) event. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 60). Dr. Kelley referenced the 
interdepartmental memorandum outlining these restrictions when he recommended to Texter on 
November 29, 2007, that plaintiff be limited to light duty. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 68). In turn, Dr. 
Mehter’s November 18, 2008 memorandum limiting plaintiff to light duty is based on Dr. 
Kelley’s November 29, 2007 memorandum. (Mehter Depo. Exh. 71). Additionally, EHS 
records dated June 10, 2008, indicate that “permanent restrictions” listed in the November 21, 
2005 memorandum were verified in a telephone call to Texter on June 10, 2008. (Mehter Depo. 
Exh. 67, p. 9). This direct evidence shows that the City relied on restrictions its physicians 
imposed as a result of plaintiffs diabetic condition to restrict him from full duty.
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Plaintiff must therefore prove that he was “disabled,” which he seeks to do by showing 
the City regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, and that he 
was qualified to perform the essential functions of his position. The ADA (and not the AD AAA) 
applies to this time period.
The prior version of the ADA defined a “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). “Working” is included among the “major life activities” listed under 
the regulations accompanying the ADA. To show he was substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working, an individual had to establish that his impairment substantially limited his 
ability to perform “a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the 
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)); Daugherty v. Sajar 
Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2008). See also Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 
764 (6th Cir. 2012) (under the prior version of the Act, in order to be regarded as disabled, an 
individual “must be regarded as having an impairment that limits a major life activity.”). “The 
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the 
major life activity of working” under the ADA. Daugherty, 544 F.3d at 704. 7
7 In contrast, the Ohio Civil Rights Act does not require that an individual who claims his employer 
regarded him as disabled to show that the employer also believed that the perceived disability limited a major life 
activity. Wells, 860 F.Supp.2d at 478 (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.01(13)) (“‘Disability’ means a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, including . . .  working; a record of a 
physical or mental impairment; or being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.”); Scalia v. Aldi, Inc., 
No. 25436,2011 WL 6740756, at **7-8 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. Dec. 21, 2011). As plaintiff has presented evidence 
establishing material issues o f fact under the ADA standard, he necessarily meets the lower threshold under Ohio 
law.
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The City contends that under the ADA, an individual is regarded as disabled only if an 
employer mistakenly believes that he has an actual, non-limiting impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities. (Doc. 24 at 11, citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; Murphy v. 
UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1999)). The City argues that plaintiff cannot meet this standard 
under the ADA with respect to the 2007 action restricting him from returning to full duty 
because the most plaintiff has shown is that the City decided to keep him on limited duty because 
he was not able to fulfill the duties of an active full-duty firefighter. (Doc. 24 at 11-12, citing 
Williams v. Stark County Bd. o f County Comm ’rs, 7 F. App’x 441 (6th Cir. 2001)). The City 
asserts this is insufficient to establish that it regarded plaintiff as unable to perform a class of 
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Plaintiff asserts the restrictions the City imposed 
on him would preclude him from working a wide range of jobs.
Neither party cites any authority from the Sixth Circuit or any other court as to whether 
the restrictions imposed by the City would preclude plaintiff from performing a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes. At least one district court from outside the Sixth Circuit 
has determined that while driving is not a major life activity, a restriction against operating 
commercial vehicles may constitute a significant restriction on the ability to perform a particular 
class of jobs. See Schlegel v. Berks Area Reading Transp. Auth., No. CIV. A. 016055, 2003 WL 
21652173 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2003). Similarly, because it appears the restrictions imposed by the 
EHS physicians during the 2007-2008 timeframe would preclude plaintiff from operating 
commercial vehicles, as well as from performing other categories of work activities, there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the City perceived plaintiff to be substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working.
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The next issue to be resolved is whether plaintiff was qualified to perform the full duties 
of a firefighter during the 2007-2008 time period. The City asserts that plaintiff was not a 
qualified individual with a disability. Although the City has not clearly articulated its argument, 
the City appears to contend that plaintiff could not perform unrestricted firefighting duties 
because he posed a direct threat to his safety and that of others due to having experienced 
hypoglycemic episodes. (Doc. 24 at 12-13). The City asserts that Dr. Kelley examined plaintiff 
after his September 2007 illness; Dr. Kelley noted plaintiff had not been a reliable historian 
regarding his insulin use; and Dr. Kelley opined that plaintiff should not perform unrestricted 
firefighting duties, particularly as he did not meet “DOT” exemption criteria for driving with 
hypoglycemic episodes. (Doc. 24 at 13, citing Mehter Depo. Exh. 63). The City asserts that the 
Sixth Circuit has found similar evidence demonstrated an employee posed a direct threat and that 
removal from full duty was not discriminatory. See Wurzel, 2012 WL 1449683. The City also 
contends that other courts have found that an employee with diabetes who experienced 
hypoglycemic episodes constituted a direct threat such that the employee’s removal from full 
duty was not discriminatory. See Darnell v. Thermaflber, Inc., 417 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir.
2005); Hutton v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2001).
The burden is on the employer to show that the plaintiff is not qualified to perform the 
requirements of a particular job because he poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. 
See Wells, 860 F. Supp.2d at 481. The regulations accompanying the ADA explain the meaning 
of “direct threat” as follows:
Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of 
the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable 
accommodation. The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall 
be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to 
safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based 
on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
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knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining 
whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered 
include:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
Here, there is a question of fact as to whether plaintiff posed a direct threat to his safety 
or that of others such that he was not qualified for a full duty firefighter position. The present 
case is distinguishable from Wurzel and the other cases on which the City relies in support of its 
direct threat defense. The Court in Wurzel granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
because it found no reasonable juror could disagree with the defendant’s determination that its 
employee posed a direct threat to his own safety and that of others in the plant. Wurzel, 2012 
WL 1449683. The Court found the defendant’s determination was based on a reasonable 
medical judgment, it relied on the most current medical judgment and best available objective 
evidence, and it reflected an individualized assessment of the plaintiffs abilities. Id., at *12.
The Court further determined that a reasonable juror could not find there was evidence of a 
reasonably based medical judgment supporting the opposite view that the plaintiff did not pose a 
direct threat. Id. Similarly, in Darnell, 417 F.3d at 661, there was not sufficient conflicting 
medical evidence, and in Hutton, 273 F.3d at 894, the Court was unable to rule out the possibility 
of a hypoglycemic event under circumstances where a single physical or mental lapse could 
result in harm of significant potential severity to the plaintiffs co-workers and others. Here, 
however, the only evidence the City cites to show plaintiff posed a direct threat is Dr. Kelley’s 
examination report following plaintiffs 2007 hospitalization. Plaintiff has produced medical 
opinions and evidence that are contrary to Dr. Kelley’s opinion and that cover the time period
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subsequent to September 2007. Thus, there is conflicting medical evidence such that the City 
has not established its direct threat defense as a matter of law.
In short, plaintiff has come forward with evidence which, if accepted as true, would allow 
a reasonable jury to find that the City regarded him as disabled during the 2007-2008 time frame 
when he was restricted to light duty; he was qualified to perform unrestricted firefighting duties 
during this time period; he was not a direct threat to the safety or health of others; and he 
suffered an adverse employment decision because the City regarded him as disabled. 
Accordingly, the City is not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs ADA and Ohio claims 
premised on this adverse action.
The second adverse employment action is the City’s refusal to reinstate plaintiff to full- 
duty status from 2009 to 2011. Plaintiff claims that the City’s refusal violated the AD AAA and 
the Ohio statute.
The definition of disability under the ADAAA is found at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Under 
the ADAAA, “disability” means:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)). 
Paragraph 3 states:
(A) An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an 
impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an 
action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a 
major life activity.
(B) Paragraph (1 )(C) shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor.
A transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 
months or less.
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Under the AD AAA, “disability” is to “be construed in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals” to the maximum extent permissible under the terms of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(4)(A). The term “substantially limits” as used under the AD AAA is “not meant to be a 
demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i). The regulations accompanying the AD AAA 
explain: “An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits 
the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the 
general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the 
individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it 
would substantially limit a major life activity when active. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.2(j)(l)(vii).
In contrast to the pre-amendment statute, under the AD AAA, a plaintiff proceeding under 
the “regarded as” prong of the disability definition need only prove the existence of an 
impairment that is neither transitory (i.e., having an actual or expected duration of 6 months or 
less) nor minor to be covered under the AD AAA. The individual no longer is required to prove 
that the employer regarded his impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity. See § 
12102(1)(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1) (2012) (an individual is “regarded as having [a disabling] 
impairment” if the individual is subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is 
perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity).
The City alleges it was proper to place plaintiff on limited duty during the 2009-2011 
time frame given his health issues during this time period. The City contends that plaintiff s own 
cardiologist removed him from full duty for several months, plaintiff was hospitalized for several 
days for multiple issues, and plaintiff had heart valve surgery and a kidney transplant. The City also 
states that plaintiff requested in the October 1, 2009 grievance he filed that he be permitted to
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remain in a limited-duty status rather than be returned to full duty pending the final outcome of 
the third-party physician review process. (Doc. 24 at 12, citing Pltf. Depo. Exh. 11).
For the reasons stated in connection with plaintiffs claim for the 2007-2008 time period, 
the Court finds there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the City regarded plaintiff 
as disabled under the more lenient AD AAA standard during the 2009-2011 time frame. 
Furthermore, there are genuine issues as to whether plaintiff was qualified to perform 
unrestricted firefighting duties during portions of the 2009-2011 time period but was nonetheless 
precluded from returning to work. The evidence shows that plaintiff was not on full duty status 
for a number of reasons during this time frame. The City began the medical separation process 
for plaintiff in 2009 based on his refusal to release his medical records and then removed 
plaintiff from paid limited duty status in November 2009. However, for the reasons explained 
below, there are issues of fact as to whether the City was entitled to the records it required 
plaintiff to provide. In addition, although plaintiff had a number of health issues during this time 
period, his treating physicians imposed only temporary restrictions as a result of these 
conditions. He was off work for five weeks in June 2010 for heart valve surgery and for six 
weeks in November 2010 for a kidney transplant. His treating physicians released him for full 
duty in January 2011 and in May 2011 the third-party physician found plaintiff could return to 
full duty. Furthermore, the fact that plaintiff asked to remain on limited duty in his October 1, 
2009 grievance is not dispositive of whether he was qualified to perform unrestricted firefighting 
duties during the entire 2009-2011 period as plaintiff requested to remain in limited duty status 
only during the pendency of the third-physician review process then underway in lieu of being 
medically separated. (Doc. 23, Exh. 11). Thus, the evidence does not show that plaintiff was 
unqualified to perform unrestricted firefighting duties for the entirety of the 2009-2011 time
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period. Finally, the City has not produced evidence to show that plaintiff posed a direct threat to 
the safety or health of himself or others during this time frame. The City is therefore not entitled 
to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim pertaining to the 2009-2011 time period.
Third, plaintiff claims that the City violated 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) by requesting his 
medical records in November 2009 and then removing him from paid limited-duty status for 
refusing to provide these records. (Doc. 30 at 19-20). Section 12112(d)(4)(A) provides: “A 
covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an 
employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or 
severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.” Plaintiff alleges the City violated the statute because the 
requested records were not related to his fitness for duty as they were over two years old; EHS 
had already determined that plaintiff was permanently restricted from full-duty firefighting; and 
plaintiff had provided recent records from his own physicians substantiating his fitness for duty. 
The City argues it followed the procedures outlined under the LMA, and the evidence amply 
demonstrates that the request for records and subsequent action based on plaintiffs refusal to 
provide the records were justified. (Doc. 32 at 3-5).
Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of fact as to whether the City violated his rights under 
the AD AAA by removing him from limited-duty status in November 2009 for refusing to 
disclose certain medical records. There is evidence that calls into question whether the records 
were related to plaintiffs ability to perform his job and whether the request was consistent with 
business necessity. Thus, the City is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
The fourth adverse action is plaintiffs removal from the PTP in November 2009. The 
City contends that plaintiff cannot meet the “disability” standard of the AD AAA with regard to
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his removal from the PTP because the record shows plaintiff suffered temporary disabilities and 
was therefore properly placed on limited duty pursuant to § 32.8 of the LMA. (Doc. 24 at 12). 
The City states it removed plaintiff from the PTP based on his inability to obtain the necessary 
“ride time” resulting from his limited-duty status and not because of a perceived disability. The 
City asserts that ride-time requirements must be fulfilled in order to complete the PTP under 
Ohio law. The City also asserts that plaintiff acknowledged it was not possible to accumulate 
ride time on City vehicles as he was on limited-duty status, and all individuals on City vehicles 
must be able to perform full duty. Although plaintiff was initially advised he could obtain his 
ride time through another fire department, the City determined this option was unworkable.
(Doc. 24 at 13-14).
There is direct evidence that the City took plaintiffs diabetic and kidney conditions into 
account when refusing to allow him to complete the PTP, so it is appropriate to analyze this 
adverse action under the direct evidence framework. There are issues of fact under the more 
liberal AD AAA standard as to whether the City regarded plaintiff as having a disabling 
impairment and removed plaintiff from the PTP because it perceived him to be restricted to 
limited, and not full, firefighting duties as a result of his diabetic and kidney conditions. Plaintiff 
has presented evidence that he was qualified to perform unrestricted firefighting duties and 
complete the requirements of the PTP. There is evidence that plaintiffs own physicians had 
attested to his capability to perform unrestricted firefighting duties, and Dr. Locasto expressed 
his preference that plaintiff perform his ride time on City units, but the City rejected his 
recommendation. (Doc. 30 at 18, citing Locasto Depo at 24, Locasto Depo. Exhs. 36, 38). The 
City has not produced evidence to show plaintiffs participation in the program would have
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posed a direct threat to his safety or to the safety of others. Accordingly, plaintiff has come 
forward with sufficient evidence to proceed to trial on this portion of his discrimination claim.
In sum, there is sufficient evidence for plaintiff to proceed to a jury on his claims that the 
City violated his rights under the federal and state anti-discrimination laws by refusing to allow 
plaintiff to return to full firefighting duties following his hospitalization in September 2007 and 
throughout 2008; by refusing to allow plaintiff to complete the PTP; by restricting plaintiff to 
limited duty from 2009 to 2011; and by removing plaintiff from limited duty for refusing to 
provide certain medical records. Although the City has asserted that plaintiff posed a direct 
threat to himself or others, the evidence plaintiff has presented is sufficient to call into question 
the validity of the City’s allegation. These issues cannot be resolved without weighing the 
evidence and making credibility determinations, which are functions that must be performed by 
the trier-of-fact. Accordingly, the City is not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs 
disability discrimination claims against it.
B. Retaliation claim against the City
Plaintiff brings a retaliation claim against the City under Ohio law. Plaintiff has clarified 
the factual basis for this claim in his response to the City’s motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in protected activity by filing a charge of discrimination with the 
OCRC and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on or about April 20, 
2009, alleging that the City discriminated against him on the basis of a perceived disability by 
removing him from the PTP. (Doc. 30 at 20). Plaintiff asserts that the City was aware of the 
charge. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he had a conversation with Assistant Fire Chief 
Corbett in October 2009 during which Corbett offered plaintiff the opportunity to return to 
“paramedic school” if plaintiff dropped his EEOC complaint. (Pltf. Depo. at 78-81). Plaintiff
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contends that after he refused to drop the charge, he was removed from limited-duty status and 
placed in unpaid status. (Doc. 30 at 20, citing Wright Depo. at 30-31). Plaintiff claims this 
action was taken against him in retaliation for filing the charge.
The City contends that plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between the filing of 
his EEOC charge on April 20, 2009, and his removal from limited duty effective October 15, 
2009. The City asserts that plaintiffs removal from limited duty was not in retaliation for the 
filing of his EEOC charge but was in response to plaintiffs refusal to release his medical 
records. (Doc. 32 at 8). The City contends that plaintiff acknowledged this as the reason for his 
removal from limited duty in a union grievance he filed on October 1, 2009. (Doc. 32 at 8, citing 
Pltf. Depo. Exh. 11). The City states that the five-month gap between the filing of the charge 
and plaintiffs removal from limited duty is insufficient, in the absence of other compelling 
evidence, to establish a causal connection between the two events. (Doc. 32 at 8-9, citing Boggs 
v. The Scotts Co., No. 04AP-425, 2005 WL 647560, at *8 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. March 22,
2005) (“[TJemporal proximity alone does not support a claim of retaliation if there is no other 
compelling evidence.”)).
Ohio law provides that it is unlawful for “any person to discriminate in any manner 
against any other person because that person has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice 
. . . . ” Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(1). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 
Ohio law, the plaintiff must show that “(1) [he] engaged in a protected activity, (2) the defending 
party was aware that the [plaintiff] had engaged in that activity, (3) the defending party took an 
adverse employment action against the employee, and (4) there is a causal connection between 
the protected activity and [the] adverse action.” Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 879 N.E.2d 174, 180 
(Ohio 2007) (citing Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990);
28
Case: 1:11-cv-00381-KLL Doc #: 34 Filed: 11/01/12 Page: 29 of 41 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008)). If the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a 
legitimate reason for its action. Id. If the defendant does so, the burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason was a pretext for retaliation. Id.
Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to proceed to a jury on his retaliation claim. 
Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct by filing an EEOC charge in April 2009. Plaintiff was 
subjected to an adverse action in October 2009 when he was removed from limited-duty status 
and placed in unpaid status. Plaintiff relies on more than temporal proximity to establish a 
causal connection between the two events. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was 
removed from limited-duty status shortly after he refused the City’s offer to allow him to return 
to paramedic school in exchange for dropping the EEOC charge. (Pltf. Depo. at 78-81). A 
reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that there was a causal connection between 
plaintiffs filing of the EEOC charge and the City’s decision to remove plaintiff from limited- 
duty status. It is for the jury to decide whether to draw the inference or to accept the legitimate 
non-retaliatory reason asserted by the City for its action. The City therefore is not entitled to 
summary judgment on plaintiffs retaliation claim.
IV. Plaintiffs claims against defendant Wright
Defendant Wright moves for summary judgment on all claims against him. First, Wright 
argues that he cannot be held personally liable for a violation of the ADA. (Doc. 22 at 20, citing 
Sullivan v. River Valley School Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 808 n.l (6th Cir. 1991); Wms. v. McLemore, 
247 F. App’x 1, 8 (6th Cir. 2007)). Second, Wright alleges that he can be held liable under Ohio 
law only for his own discriminatory conduct occurring in the workplace. (Doc. 22 at 21, citing 
Genaro v. Cent. Transport, Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 1999)). Wright contends he did not
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violate plaintiffs rights under the Ohio anti-discrimination statute by refusing to return plaintiff 
to full-duty status from October 2007 forward and by removing plaintiff from the City’s PTP in 
April 2009. In addition, Wright contends that plaintiff cannot establish a claim of retaliation 
against him because there is no evidence of a causal connection between plaintiffs filing of his 
EEOC charge and Wright’s decision to remove him from limited-duty status. Wright further 
argues that plaintiffs claims based on Wright’s failure to return plaintiff to unrestricted duty are 
preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) because they require an 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the union. In 
addition, Wright contends that he is immune from suit under Ohio Rev. Code Ch. 2744. Finally, 
Wright contends he is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for punitive damages 
because plaintiff cannot establish actual malice.
A. Wright is subject to liability on certain claims.
A manager or supervisor who does not otherwise qualify as an employer cannot be held 
personally liable under the ADA. See Wathen v. General Electric., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997). 
For purposes of Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4112, however, a supervisor/manager may be held 
jointly and/or severally liable with his employer for the supervisor/manager’s own 
discriminatory conduct. Genaro, 703 N.E.2d 782. Thus, Wright can potentially be held liable 
for disability discrimination only under Ohio law.
Before turning to the merits of plaintiffs disability discrimination claims, the Court will 
address Wright’s LMRA preemption and statutory immunity arguments. Wright argues that 
plaintiffs claim of disability discrimination based on Wright’s failure to return him to full duty 
is preempted by the LMRA because the LMA must be interpreted in order to determine whether 
Wright had the authority to return plaintiff to unrestricted duty. Section 301 of the LMRA
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preempts “any state-law claim arising from a breach of a collective bargaining agreement.” 
Mattis v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 
F.2d 1326, 1329 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc)). A two-step inquiry must be undertaken to determine 
whether a state-law claim survives § 301 preemption: (1) whether resolving the state-law claim 
would require interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement; and (2) whether 
the rights claimed by the plaintiff were created by the collective bargaining agreement or instead 
by state law. Id. at 906 (citing DeCoe v. G.M. Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994)). If a 
state-law claim fails either of these two requirements, it is preempted by § 301. Id.
The Court finds that § 301 preemption does not apply here. First, the ultimate issue of 
whether Wright refused to return plaintiff to full duty because Wright perceived him as disabled 
does not depend upon an interpretation of the LMA. To the contrary, there is no disagreement 
regarding the pertinent provisions of the LMA and their applicability to this case insofar as they 
pertain to Wright’s exercise of discretion. Second, the right to be free from disability 
discrimination is derived from Ohio’s anti-discrimination statute rather than the collective 
bargaining agreement. Accordingly, neither prong of the two-part test for preemption is 
satisfied.
Nor is Wright shielded from personal liability for plaintiffs discrimination and retaliation 
claims by the statutory immunity provision of Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03. Pursuant to that 
provision, employees of political subdivisions are generally immune from liability unless one of 
the following applies:
(a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the 
employee’s employment or official responsibilities;
(b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a 
wanton or reckless manner;
(c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised 
Code.. . .
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Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6). Wright asserts that none of the exceptions to statutory 
immunity are present in this case. He argues there is no dispute he was acting within the scope 
of his duties when he made decisions concerning plaintiffs employment; no reasonable jury 
could find that his acts or omissions rose to the level of egregiousness described in subsection 
(b); and although Ohio appellate courts have reached different conclusions as to whether Ohio 
Rev. Code Ch. 4112 expressly imposes liability upon supervisors and managers of political 
subdivisions charged with discrimination, the Court should follow the decision of the lone Ohio 
appellate court that has determined there is no supervisory liability under the anti-discrimination 
statute. (Doc. 22 at 37-38, citing cases).
Wright’s argument is not well-taken. Two judges in this district have previously decided 
that the third exception to statutory immunity applies to a claim brought under Chapter 4112.
See Conant v. Delaware County Bd. o f County Com ’rs, No. 2:10-cv-221, 2011 WL 4383444, at 
*12 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2011) (Sargus, J.); Satterfield v. Karnes, 736 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1151-54 
(S.D. Ohio 2010) (Holschuh, J.). The Court adopts the reasoning of those decisions and finds 
that as the potential for civil liability is imposed on Wright by Chapter 4112, statutory immunity 
is inapplicable to him.
B. Wright is not entitled to summary judgment on all claims.
Turning to the merits of plaintiffs claims, the Court will address each of the adverse 
actions alleged by plaintiff. The first purported adverse action is Wright’s order that plaintiff 
submit to a fitness-for-duty examination in 2007 followed by Wright’s refusal to return plaintiff 
to unrestricted duty from 2007 to 2008 based on the results of the examination. Plaintiff assumes 
for purposes of his summary judgment motion that direct evidence of discrimination by Wright 
does not exist. (Doc. 31 at 4). Plaintiff argues, however, that he can establish a prima facie case
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of discrimination against defendant Wright. Plaintiff contends that Wright ordered the fitness- 
for-duty examination without a proper basis for doing so and then used the “illegal examination” 
to obtain an opinion from EHS upon which Wright could rely to remove plaintiff from full-duty. 
(Doc. 31 at 6-7). Plaintiff contends that although Wright denies he could have returned plaintiff 
to full-duty absent a third-party physician’s recommendation, District Chief Texter contradicted 
Wright’s testimony and testified that Wright did have such authority. (Texter Depo. at 54-55).
Wright argues that plaintiff has failed to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination as 
to the fitness-for-duty examination because plaintiff cannot show (1) that a demand for a valid 
fitness-for-duty examination is an adverse action, or (2) that plaintiff was a qualified individual 
with a disability. (Doc. 22 at 24). Wright further contends that plaintiff has not shown that his 
reason for leaving plaintiff on limited duty after the initial fitness-for-duty examination in 2007 
was a pretext for discrimination. (Id. at 24-27). Wright asserts he did not return plaintiff to 
unrestricted duty at any point between 2007 and Wright’s retirement in early 2011 because 
Wright did not have the authority under the LMA to do so. Wright asserts he was precluded by § 
32.8 of the LMA from removing plaintiff from limited duty before a third-party physician review 
was conducted. Wright states that pursuant to § 32.8, once an EHS physician determines that an 
employee is unable to function safely as a firefighter, the Fire Chief has the discretion to either 
(1) place the employee on limited duty, or (2) decline to return the employee to work in any 
capacity. (Id. at 25). Wright asserts that the Fire Chief does not have the discretion to override 
the EHS physician’s opinion that the employee is unable to function as a full-duty firefighter, 
even if the employee’s personal physician has released him for unrestricted duty. (Doc. 22 at 25, 
citing Wright Depo. at 26, Texter Depo. at 49-50). Rather, in that instance, a third-party 
physician must be consulted to resolve the conflict. (Pltf. Depo. Exh. 11, LMA § 28.12). Wright
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argues that even if he had the authority to override EHS’s decision to place plaintiff on limited- 
duty status, no reasonable juror could find that he failed to do so because he perceived plaintiff to 
be disabled. (Doc. 22 at 26-27). Wright alleges that he cannot be faulted for relying on the 
professional opinions of the EHS physicians. {Id.).
The Court finds that plaintiff has not come forward with sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wright violated the Ohio Civil Rights statute by 
ordering a fitness-for-duty examination in 2007 and then refusing to reinstate plaintiff to full 
duty at any time during the 2007-2008 time frame. First, plaintiff has not shown that Wright 
acted improperly by ordering the fitness-for-duty examination. The evidence shows that it was 
reported to Wright in September 2007 that plaintiff had pneumonia. (Wright Depo. at 24). 
According to plaintiffs own testimony, Wright had the discretion under the terms of the LMA to 
require plaintiff to submit to a fitness-for-duty examination following his hospitalization and 
pneumonia diagnosis in September 2007. (Pltf. Depo. at 144-147).
Second, the only evidence plaintiff points to as “the basis” for Wright’s decision to not 
return plaintiff to full duty is Dr. Kelley’s memorandum opining that plaintiff was unable to 
work a broad class of jobs {i.e., driving City vehicles, working around open dangerous 
machinery, or working at unprotected heights). (Mehter Depo. Ex. 60). Although plaintiff 
asserts that Wright had the authority to return plaintiff to full duty despite the opinion of the EHS 
physician that he was not fit for such duty (Doc. 31 at 9, citing Texter Depo. at 54-55), Texter 
testified only that as a department head Wright “probably could” do so. Texter clarified that 
Wright generally would not overrule the EHS’s decision under such circumstances because 
Wright would then become liable for any injury or illness suffered by that individual, and Texter 
was not aware of anyone for whom Wright had overridden the decision of the EHS physician.
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(Texter Depo. at 54-55). Texter’s testimony thus shows that Wright followed the standard 
procedure in not returning plaintiff to full duty under the circumstances and does not permit an 
inference that Wright acted as he did for some improper purpose. Wright was entitled to rely on 
the findings of the EHS physician that plaintiff was not able to return to full duty. Accordingly, 
plaintiff has not produced evidence to proceed to trial on his claim that Wright violated Ohio law 
by ordering a fitness-for-duty examination and failing to return plaintiff to full duty based on the 
results of that examination.
The second adverse action is Wright’s refusal to reinstate plaintiff to full duty from 2009 
to 2011. Plaintiff alleges that Wright could have returned him to full duty at any time absent a 
third-party physician’s recommendation. (Doc. 31 at 10, citing Texter Depo. at 54-55). To show 
Wright failed to do so based on an improper motive, plaintiff points to deposition testimony that 
Texter and the union president heard Wright state he would not return plaintiff to full duty even 
if a third-party physician recommended it. (Doc. 31 at 10, citing Texter Depo. at 23; Pltf. Depo. 
Exh. 3 2).8 The cited testimony is too vague, however, to carry plaintiffs burden to show that 
Wright perceived him as disabled and would have reinstated him to full duty at any time between 
2009 to 2011 but for the perceived disability. Texter actually testified that he believes he heard 
Wright indicate during a discussion that plaintiff would not be returned to full duty even if a 
third-party physician recommended his return, but Texter does not know when the discussion 
took place and he does not know the context in which Wright made the statement. (Texter Depo. 
at 23). Plaintiff has not produced any other evidence to carry his burden on his discrimination 
claim against Wright for this time period. Therefore, Wright is entitled to summary judgment on 
this claim.
8Plaintiff has not submitted this deposition exhibit and it is not part of the record before the Court.
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The third adverse action is plaintiffs dismissal from the City’s PTP. Plaintiff disputes 
Wright’s contentions that (1) defendants were justified in placing him on limited-duty status, and 
(2) being on limited duty automatically rendered him unable to fulfill the ride time requirements. 
Plaintiff argues that his treating physicians attested to his ability to perform unrestricted 
firefighting duties. Further, he contends that even if the City could have restricted him from full- 
duty firefighting, his preclusion from the PTP was discriminatory because it was based on 
misguided assumptions rather than an analysis of how his medical condition affected his ability 
to perform the program requirements. Plaintiff alleges that Wright disregarded recommendations 
that the City Medical Director, Dr. Locasto, made on January 15, 2009 and March 4, 2009, that 
plaintiff be permitted to perform his ride time on City units (Doc. 31 at 12, citing Locasto Depo. 
at 24, Locasto Depo. Exhs. 36, 38), and plaintiff notes that Dr. Locasto testified that plaintiff 
would not have been prevented by his dialysis needs from performing his ride time on City units. 
(Doc. 31 at 12, citing Locasto Depo. at 18). Plaintiff further relies on the testimony of Assistant 
Fire Chief Corbett that plaintiff was treated differently than other firefighters who were 
permitted to complete ride-time requirements while on limited duty. (Id. at 13, citing Corbett 
Depo. at 46, 48). Plaintiff argues that a reasonable trier-of-fact could conclude based on the 
evidence that he was treated differently than similarly-situated individuals on limited duty and 
that but for Wright’s perception that he was disabled, he would have been permitted to remain in 
the PTP. (Id. at 13).
Wright assumes plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to this 
claim but asserts a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff s removal from the 
program, i.e., his limited-duty status rendered him unable to meet the training program’s ride 
time requirements because the City has a policy against permitting firefighters on limited duty
36
Case: 1:11-cv-00381-KLL Doc #: 34 Filed: 11/01/12 Page: 37 of 41 PAGEID #: <pageID>
from riding on rescue units. (Doc. 22 at 28-29; Doc. 33 at 11, citing Corbett Depo. at 12; Pltf. 
Depo. Exh. 36). Defendant Wright disputes that plaintiff was similarly-situated with the 
individuals to whom he seeks to compare himself and asserts that plaintiff provides no details 
about pregnant female firefighters who allegedly were allowed to do ride-time while on limited 
duty.
Plaintiff has come forward with evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to 
the legitimacy of the stated reason for his withdrawal from the PTP. Specifically, plaintiff has 
called into question whether he was treated differently than similarly-situated firefighters who 
participated in the PTP. Assistant Fire Chief Corbett testified that he told Wright that he did not 
think Wright should remove plaintiff from the PTP. (Corbett Depo. at 47). Corbett stated he 
disagreed with Wright’s decision to withdraw plaintiff from the PTP because he thought “we 
were treating him different than they treated other people.” (Corbett Depo. at 45). Specifically, 
Corbett testified that he thought plaintiff was being treated differently than other firefighters who 
had been on light duty status and were allowed to complete paramedic training classes. (Id. at 
45-47). Wright asserts that the situations of these individuals differed from plaintiffs situation. 
Wright notes that Corbett testified he did not believe firefighter Haki Zuberi took the training in­
house or through any of the City’s programs and firefighter Vernon Simpson, who was in the 
first class of graduates from the PTP, was likewise unable to complete ride time due to his 
limited duty status and did not complete the requirement until he returned to full duty. (Doc. 33 
at 12, citing Corbett Depo. at 46-47). However, Corbett’s testimony indicates that in contrast to 
plaintiff, these individuals were permitted to participate in the PTP despite being on light duty 
status. (Id. at 46-47). The evidence presents an issue as to whether plaintiff was treated 
differently from similarly-situated individuals and was forced to withdraw from the PTP program
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based on a perceived disability. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to proceed to a jury on this claim 
against defendant Wright.
The fourth adverse action is Wright’s acting in concert with EHS to coerce plaintiff into 
providing his medical records in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Because plaintiff 
concedes that Wright cannot be held liable for a violation of the ADA or AD AAA, Wright is 
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Plaintiff also brings a retaliation claim against Wright under Ohio law, alleging that 
Wright removed him from limited-duty status in retaliation for filing the EEOC charge in April 
2009. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was removed from limited-duty status shortly 
after he refused the City’s offer to allow him to return to paramedic school in exchange for 
dropping the EEOC charge. (Pltf. Depo. at 78-81). Plaintiff asserts that the short time frame 
between Corbett’s request that he drop his charge and Wright’s decision to remove him from 
limited-duty status is sufficient to establish a causal connection between the two events.
Wright argues there is no evidence of a causal connection between plaintiffs filing of the 
EEOC charge in April 2009 and his decision to remove plaintiff from full-duty status. Wright 
contends his decision was based on plaintiffs refusal to sign a medical release so that EHS 
physicians could have access to his medical records. (Wright Depo. at 30-31). Wright asserts 
there is no evidence he was aware any City employee had asked plaintiff to drop his 
discrimination charge. (Doc. 33 at 14). Wright further notes that although plaintiff testified that 
Corbett asked him to drop his charge in October 2009, this was after Texter had written to 
plaintiff and informed him that his continued refusal to release medical records to EHS would 
result in termination of his limited duty status. {Id. at 14, citing Pltf. Depo. Exh. 17).
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A reasonable jury could reasonably infer that there was a causal connection between 
plaintiffs filing of the EEOC charge and Wright’s decision to remove plaintiff from limited-duty 
status. Corbett testified that there had been discussions within the Fire Department about 
presenting a proposal to plaintiff to allow him to return to the PTP if he dropped his charge 
against the City, and it was his impression Wright was trying to make things difficult for 
plaintiff. (Corbett Depo. at 24-25). A reasonable juror could infer that as Fire Chief, Wright was 
involved in these discussions about presenting a proposal to plaintiff to withdraw his charge. 
Although Wright articulated a legitimate reason for plaintiffs removal from the PTP, it is up to 
the jury to determine whether the decision to remove plaintiff from limited duty status was made 
in retaliation for plaintiffs refusal to withdraw the charge, or whether it was based on plaintiff s 
refusal to release his medical records. Because the Court cannot weigh the evidence and make 
credibility determinations necessary to resolve this issue, Wright is not entitled to summary 
judgment on plaintiffs retaliation claim.
Finally, Wright contends that plaintiffs claim for punitive damages must be dismissed 
because no reasonable juror could find that Wright acted with actual malice. Wright relies on 
plaintiffs deposition testimony that the two individuals had no communications and “no 
relationship” as of 2007 to show Wright could not have acted with actual malice. (Doc. 22 at 36, 
citing Pltf. Depo. at 147, 173). Plaintiff contends there is evidence that Wright harbored hatred 
and ill will toward him. In addition to evidence plaintiff has previously cited to demonstrate that 
Wright discriminated against him, plaintiff relies on Corbett’s testimony that it was his 
impression Wright tried to make things difficult for plaintiff and that Wright appeared to be 
upset when talking about plaintiff. (Doc. 31 at 18, citing Corbett Depo. at 25-26).
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Punitive damages may be awarded in an action under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.99 if there 
is evidence of actual malice. Rice v. CertainTeed Corp., 704 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ohio 1999). 
“Actual malice, necessary for an award of punitive damages, is (1) that state of mind under 
which a person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a 
conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of 
causing substantial harm.” Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, syll. (Ohio 1987) (emphasis in 
original). “The first prong of actual malice has also been defined as conduct characterized by 
‘retaliation, or a determination to vent. . .  feelings upon other persons.’” Meyers v. Hot Bagels 
Factory, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1068, 1078 (Ohio App. 1st Dist. 1999). Actual malice may be inferred 
from conduct and surrounding circumstances that may be characterized as “reckless, wanton, 
willful, or gross.” Id. (citing Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 575 N.E.2d 416, 419 
(Ohio 1991) (quoting Preston, 512 N.E.2d 1174, syll.). “It is the egregiousness of the 
defendant’s conduct that determines the appropriateness of an award of punitive damages. In 
Ohio, egregiousness is defined by the defendant’s evil or depraved mental state or his 
willingness to disregard almost certain injury.” Id.
The Court finds that plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence to proceed to 
trial on his claim for punitive damages against Wright. The evidence supporting plaintiff s 
retaliation claim is likewise “sufficient to show malice for purposes of punitive damages: actual 
malice has been defined as ‘that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by 
hatred or ill will, a spirit of revenge, retaliation, or a determination to vent his feelings upon 
other persons.” Toole v. Cook, No. 98AM 86, 1999 WL 280804, at *7 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 
1999) (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted) (abrogated on other grounds). Accordingly, 
Wright is not entitled to summary judgment on the punitive damages claim.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1) Defendant City of Cincinnati’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 24) is DENIED.
2) Defendant Robert Wright’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22) is GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part.
Date: l l / l  / /  <Z-
Karen L. Litkovitz 
United States Magistrate Judge
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